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I. INTRODUCTION
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the United States Supreme Court correctly concluded that courts had both the power and the responsibility to decide whether a successful patent owner needed injunctive relief and whether the imposition of that relief would unduly harm either the defendant or the public. The Court's application of the traditional four-factor equity test led, for the first time, to a significant number of cases in which courts found patent infringement but refused to enjoin continued infringement. That, in turn, has raised the question "what happens then?"
As a matter of policy, the basic answer seems clear: while the patentee can't enjoin infringement, the infringer should have to pay for the right to continue infringing. But that answer conceals three subsidiary questions. First, do courts have the authority to award an ongoing royalty? Second, who decides what that royalty should be? Finally, how should that royalty be calculated? To date, courts have spent little time thinking about the first and second questions. While they have addressed the third question, they haven't done so in a satisfactory manner. In this article, I endeavor to answer these questions.
II. AUTHORITY TO ORDER ONGOING ROYALTIES
Section 283 provides that upon a finding of infringement, a court "may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity."
2 Section 284 requires a court to award damages "adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty." 3 The traditional understanding of these remedial provisions is that section 283 operates prospective-S©0 2011 Mark A. Lemley.
* William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; partner, Durie Tangri equity, at least in their current lawsuit. While some may use this conclusion as a reason to argue for injunctive relief (on the theory that otherwise plaintiffs get nothing), taking this approach seriously in the wake of eBay may present a bleak prospect for prevailing patent plaintiffs: no injunction and no ongoing royalty.
If courts in fact have no authority to grant ongoing royalties, one possible workaround is to file successive lawsuits to obtain past damages for each new period of infringement." A district court in Texas has taken this approach, declining to award ongoing royalties in lieu of damages, instead ordering the plaintiff to file a new lawsuit for damages based on the ongoing infringement.12 Because remedies for future infringement become remedies for past infringement with the passage of time, the filing of a successive array of suits could allow the award of damages for each new period.
And it would have the advantage of providing courts an opportunity to revisit the decision to deny an injunction should circumstances change. Still, it seems odd to say that the only possible solution is to doom the parties, Zeno-like, to an endless succession of lawsuits presenting the same issue and leading (hopefully, at least) to the same outcome.
Courts need not resort to such a trick, however. Ongoing royalty awards should be available under one of two theories. First, section 284 arguably gives courts the authority to award forward-looking as well as backwardlooking damages. The statute not only permits but also requires courts to award "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement."l 4 In General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., the Supreme Court gave the statute a broad reading, finding Congress's purpose to have been "affording patent owners complete compensation."" The statute does not identify what "the infringement" is. G6mez-Arostegui assumes that the term refers only to past infringement,16 but it isn't necessarily so limited. If a defendant infringes over a period of ten years, seven before the judgment and three after the judgment, one possible reading of the statute is that all of the defendant's sales of the same product are "the infringement" for which the patentee must be compensated. While damages are generally backward-looking, the law in many circumstances gives forward-looking damages based on estimates of losses caused by past acts of infringement. Courts will, in appropriate circumstances, grant damages based on the consequences for future market relationships of past acts of patent infringement, compensating patent owners for future lost sales resulting from 11. For a discussion of how this might work, see Janicke, supra note 7, at 174. 26 This equity power easily could justify the award of ongoing royalties. Strictly speaking, such equity awards are not damages, but they serve the same purpose: to compensate the patentee for injury that would otherwise go unremedied.
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In short, while the question is not free from doubt, there are reasonable arguments for treating ongoing royalties as within either the law or the equity power of the courts rather than resorting to a series of continuing lawsuits for past damages. Courts seem to agree that at least some authority exists for such an award; those courts that deny injunctive relief overwhelmingly award an ongoing royalty in its place.
III. WHO SETS THE ONGOING ROYALTY?
Ongoing royalty awards almost always are set by the district judge as part of post-trial briefing. 28 The Federal Circuit generatly endorsed this approach in both Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. and Amado v. Microsoft Corp.29 In Paice, the Federal Circuit grounded the court's authority to do so in equity; it did not consider whether section 284 could justify ongoing royalties as an award of damages. If he has been fraudulently induced to part with this title, he may sue in equity for rescission of the transfer and if successful may obtain full redress for infringement by way of injunction, accounting, declaration of trust, or other forms of equitable relief.").
27. While G6mez-Arostegui argues that there were no precise analogues to ongoing royalty awards in English chancery law, that is not the right question even under the most restrictive Supreme Court equity case. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (holding that the debate over equity powers should be conducted by Congress, not the courts). Rather, the question is whether the equitable remedy is of a type traditionally granted in equity, as opposed to an entirely new sort of remedy. Accountings for profits and constructive trusts were well-established in equity, and indeed an accounting for profits was a statutory remedy in patent law until 1946. See, e.g 
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The source of authority bears directly on the question of who should set the ongoing royalty. Patent damages are legal remedies that are subject to the Seventh Amendment.31 Consequently, those remedies must be set by the jury, assuming one is requested (and one virtually always is). 32 So, if the basis for awarding ongoing royalties lies in section 284, those royalties must be assessed by the jury.
33 By contrast, if the question is one of equity, courts have the power (and ultimately the responsibility) to set the award. While courts can convene advisory juries on equitable questions, 34 they cannot abdicate their ultimate decision-making responsibility to the jury.
District courts, not juries, usually set ongoing royalties. Perhaps this practice reflects an (unexpressed) conclusion that the award of ongoing royalties cannot be considered a measure of damages. More likely, this system reflects the practical realities of timing. In most cases, jurors award damages as part of an overall ruling on patent validity and infringement. Then they go home. By the time the judge rules on whether the patentee is entitled to an injunction, it is too late to send the ongoing royalties question back to the same jury. Judges may be reluctant to convene a second jury just to decide the ongoing royalty question.
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IV. CALCULATING THE ONGOING ROYALTY Setting an ongoing royalty might seem an impossible task -a prediction of the future. Measuring damages based on projected future sales does require a certain amount of speculation. But patent damages regularly involve even more speculative conclusions. For example, lost profits awards require the recreation of a hypothetical world in which the court uses economic evidence to try to predict what would have happened but for the infringement. 33. Indeed, as we will see in Part IV, there is a reasonable argument that they would have to be assessed by the same jury that awarded past damages.
34. See, e.g., Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 180 F.3d 1343 , 1345 Cir. 1999).
35. As I note in Part IV, this problem could be solved if the jury was asked to identify an ongoing royalty as well as past damages.
Lost profits cases consider not just provable sales lost to the infringer, but also issues such as how an infringer's customers would split between different suppliers, whether the patentee would have made sales of unpatented products normally associated with the patented invention, how the patentee's cost structure or market share would have changed but for the infringement,
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and how that change would have affected future sales. Reasonable royalty awards also involve speculation: what would the plaintiff and defendant have agreed to as a royalty if they had decided to agree, rather than spending $5 million per side in legal fees to litigate the case all the way to trial? 37 Further, courts can limit the speculative nature of ongoing royalty awards. A lump-sum royalty award for future infringement does require significant speculation. It requires a prediction of how many infringing products will be sold in the remaining life of the patent, the price at which they will be sold, and the percentage of that price the patentee would be willing to pay. Because each of those factors can vary over time, a forward-looking lumpsum award is unlikely to accurately capture the future injury to the patentee. A per-unit dollar royalty is somewhat better, because a court does not need to accurately estimate how many products the defendant will sell; the defendant 38 simply pays a dollar amount each quarter based on what it actually did sell. But a per-unit dollar royalty is vulnerable to changes over time in the price or value of the product; a $25 royalty on a $1000 product becomes more onerous if the price of the product drops to $200 over time and a better deal if the price increases to $2000. The best option is an ongoing percentage royalty, which obviates the need to predict either the quantity sold or the price. It is still a prediction -the relative value of the patented technology to the other components of the defendant's product may change over time -but it is the best prediction we have. And awarding ongoing royalties seems a better option than presiding over an endless stream of lawsuits between the same parties.
Finally, a court setting an ongoing royalty after a finding of infringement is not writing on a blank slate. A jury has already set a reasonable roy- 
38.
Continuing royalties have the additional advantage of taking full account of design-around possibilities. A defendant that has already paid damages up front will have no incentive to design around the patent, while a defendant who must pay a royalty for future infringing products will internalize the true marginal cost of making those products, and so will have an incentive to design around the patent if it is efficient to do so.
On the other hand, quarterly payments based on actual sales require continuing court oversight and depend on the ability of the patentee or the court to obtain accurate sales information from the defendant.
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alty for past damages. 39 According to black-letter patent law, a reasonable royalty represents the rate a willing buyer and a willing seller would have agreed upon if they had known that the patent was valid and infringed. 40 Conveniently, that determination is precisely what an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction is supposed to represent: what the parties would be willing to agree on now that they know the patent is valid and infringed. Thus, the answer to how to set the ongoing royalty seems straightforward: it is the royalty the jury set for past damages assuming validity and infringement. Ideally, the jury will have awarded past damages in the form of a percentage royalty, and we should encourage awards in that form. If so, the judge need only impose the same royalty rate on a going-forward basis. Even if the jury didn't do so, the court will usually be able to determine the implicit royalty rate from the testimony and the dollar award actually given.41
One complication is whether the defendant, having lost the suit, is now a willful infringer, giving the judge discretion to treble the ongoing royalty rate, as the district court did in Amado v. Microsoft Corp.42 The logic seems straightforward: if I now know that I am infringing a valid patent, and I continue to do it, surely I am a willful infringer. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit rejected that conclusion in Amado, 4 3 and was probably right to do so. If a court has decided that the defendant should be allowed to continue to sell the infringing product because enjoining its sale imposes too great a hardship on either the defendant or the public, it seems odd to then punish the defendant for doing the very thing the court just permitted. The question is not free from doubt; awarding treble ongoing royalties might be a middle ground between merely compensating the patentee and enjoining the product altogether. The punitive nature of treble royalties would encourage the defendant to de- Essentially every non-Hatch-Waxman case involves a past damage award, because it is almost unheard-of for a defendant to stop producing its product pending trial merely because it has been sued. Even if it did, it would frequently owe damages for sales made after constructive notice of the patent but before it ceased production. While some damage awards involve lost profits, not reasonable royalties, those cases all involve patentees that participate in the market, and so they are likely to lead to injunctions rather than ongoing royalties. See Christopher S. award of an ongoing royalty of $25 per unit, a rate identical to the jury's award of past damages. 45 The court said that the question of post-verdict royalties was different from pre-verdict royalties and that the parties should have an opportunity to negotiate an agreement post-verdict before the court sets the ongoing royalty.46 In Amado v. Microsoft Corp., in which the court rejected an ongoing royalty that was triple the past damages award, the court suggested in a footnote that a new approach was required.4 Neither court set a rule for how ongoing royalties were to be calculated in this new approach. The closest the Federal Circuit came to doing so was a footnote in Amado suggesting that the calculation should use the jury's damage award as a floor and the plaintiff's request as a ceiling -and in Amado the ceiling was fifty times the floor. In other words, because of the Federal Circuit's instruction, the district court on remand replaced a more reliable calculation of damages with a notoriously unreliable one that quadrupled the original damages award.
The Federal Circuit has offered two reasons for redoing the pre-verdict calculation. First, Paice suggests that parties must be given an opportunity to settle the case once they know the jury's verdict, and a separate damages calculation gives them the opportunity to do so.
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Second, Amado suggests that the royalty will be different once parties know that the patent is valid and infringed.
Neither argument is persuasive. Parties may reassess their positions based on new information -the jury verdict. They may decide they want to settle as a result. But we don't need a second damages trial to cause them to do so. Parties can settle cases at any time; the vast majority do so, often on 54 the courthouse steps or on appeal.
They settle cases even in the face of a clear damages award that the defendant would have to pay absent settlement.5 In any event, the significant possibility of reversal on appealso gives the parties plenty of uncertainty over which to bargain even apart from the damages calculation.
The second idea, that ongoing royalties reflect an entirely different calculus from past damages, makes no sense. The ongoing royalty question is the very same question the jury has just resolved: what would a willing buyer and a willing seller who know the patent is valid and infringed have agreed to as a royalty rate? Amado's suggestion that the jury would have come to a different number had it known the patent was valid and infringed ignores the black letter law of reasonable royalties. Juries are already required to assume Federal Circuit has since laid that "rule" to rest. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315. Ironically, were Paice still ongoing, this change would necessitate yet another remand of the damages award.
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Paice, 609 F. Supp. at 630. The court modified the award somewhat, reducing the 25% rate by 1/3 due to the particular factual circumstances. that the patent is valid and infringed when setting past damages.
There is no reason to think that asking the same question twice should produce differ-58 ent answers in most cases.
Indeed, doing so may even be unconstitutional. The Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to jury trial on certain patent questions, including patent damages. If section 284 is the basis for awarding ongoing royalties, then ongoing royalties are patent damages that presumably must be set by the jury.
But the lesser-known reexamination clause of the Seventh Amendment provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." 6 1 Thus, if the factual question is the same for both past and ongoing royalties, the Constitution prohibits having either the court or a second jury reexamine the facts decided by the first jury.62
The reexamination clause makes convening a second jury problematic. As noted above, however, courts generally haven't handled ongoing royalties by reconvening juries. Instead, they have ordered ongoing royalties from the bench, perhaps using their equity authority to do so. But the fact that courts are awarding an equitable accounting rather than money damages doesn't free them from the dictates of the Seventh Amendment. Courts may have separate authority to award an equitable accounting, but in doing so they cannot reexamine facts found by the jury in the past damages award. And because the 57. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
It may be that, while courts pay lip service to the assumption that the licensed patent was valid and infringed, in practice they ignore that requirement. factual question the jury is answering is the same question the court is supposed to answer, a court ordering an accounting cannot lawfully engage in a "separate calculation" designed to replicate the first. Notably, this reexamination clause problem would infect even the series of subsequent lawsuits that G6mez-Arostegui concludes are the only legitimate alternative.M The jury in the second lawsuit would be reexamining the damages question, just as a factfinder assessing an ongoing royalty would be. The result would be truly bizarre -a new trial in which every issue has already been determined in a legally binding way.
One possible difference is that past damages reflect a reasonable royalty calculated based on the state of affairs at the time infringement began.'6 Perhaps ongoing royalties should be calculated based on the parties' later knowledge.
But as a practical matter, courts in damages cases allow consideration of subsequent developments in setting their reasonable royalty under the so-called "book of wisdom," so this distinction is largely illusory.
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On occasion, the Federal Circuit has found that changed circumstances 68 compel different royalty rates. The fact that circumstances can change provides a reason to make the past damages measure a presumptive rather than a required basis for the ongoing royalty. Indeed, it may even be possible that lost profits rather than reasonable royalties will be appropriate in the future, should the plaintiff succeed in entering the market. However, to depart from the jury's award, the factfinder should have to determine that circumstances have in fact changed.
Instead of recalculating royalties, a court setting ongoing royalties should do one of two things: ask the jury in its special verdict form to specify the percentage royalty rate and use that rate for an ongoing royalty, or set a royalty rate derived from the trial testimony and the jury's lump-sum damag-69 es award. In either event, the judge's obligation is to conform the ongoing 69. Alternatively, we could ask the jury to set both past and future royalty rates, though again there must be some justification for setting two different rates.
There is a reasonable argument that if a jury given the choice between a royalty rate and a lump-sum damages number chooses the latter, that lump sum payment represents the patentee's entire compensation for the period of patent infringe- [Vol. 76 706 royalty to what the jury awarded, not to depart from it, absent proof of circumstances going forward that differ from those the jury considered in setting past damages. The jury's past damages award should be the presumptive basis for the ongoing royalty; a party that wants to depart from that number should have to show why changed circumstances require it.
V. CONCLUSION
Law professors love to write papers explaining why the law imposes obstacles to doing either the right thing or the easy thing. This is not such a paper. In this case, the easy solution is not only the right one, but may actually be legally compelled. Patentees who do not qualify for injunctive relief are entitled to ongoing royalties to compensate them for future infringement. Those ongoing royalties for future infringement should be set at the same rate as damages for past infringement. That's easiest to do if the jury awards a royalty percentage. But even if it doesn't, district courts should award a royalty that gives effect to the jury's findings, not one that disregards them. ment, past and future. After all, when parties to a license agreement negotiate a lump sum payment rather than an ongoing royalty, they generally intend that lump sum payment to represent complete compensation for the term of the patent. See Phillip Mendes, To License a Patent -or, to Assign It: Factors Influencing the Choice, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/docume nts/pdf/license assign patent.pdf (last visited June 27, 2011). No license agreement I have ever read involves a lump sum payment for a period of years and then converts to a running royalty. Thus, in any case in which the jury given the option concludes that a lump sum payment would be the appropriate royalty, the ongoing royalty rate should arguably be zero. 
